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ABSTRACT: This paper is an introduction to the special issue commemorating the 50th anniversary of the publication 
of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. It introduces some main ideas of Structure, as its 
change in historical perspective for the interpretation of scientific progress, the role and nature of scientific 
communities, the incommensurability concept, or the new-world problem, and summarizes some philo-
sophical reactions. After this introduction, the special issue includes papers by Alexander Bird, Paul 
Hoyningen-Huene and George Reisch on different aspects of Kuhn’s work.  
Keywords: Kuhn; structure; paradigms; normal science; scientific revolutions. 
RESUMEN: Este artículo es una introducción al número monográfico que conmemora el 50º aniversario de la publi-
cación de La estructura de las revoluciones científicas de Thomas Kuhn. En la introducción se presentan algunas 
de las ideas principales del libro, como su cambio de perspectiva histórica para la interpretación del progre-
so científico, el papel y naturaleza de las comunidades científicas, el concepto de inconmensurabilidad o el 
problema del cambio de mundo, y se resumen algunas reacciones filosóficas a las mismas. Tras la introduc-
ción, el número monográfico está compuesto por artículos de Alexander Bird, Paul Hoyningen-Huene y 
George Reisch que versan sobre diversos aspectos de la obra de Kuhn. 
Palabras clave: Kuhn; estructura; paradigmas; ciencia normal; revoluciones científicas. 
1. Introduction  
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ranks high among the most significant books in 
twentieth-century philosophy of science. Its influence has been much broader, 
though. Thomas Kuhn’s ideas, as they appear in that book, have influenced many re-
flections about the relation between science and society, science and religion, science 
and politics, and many other conjunctions of “science and …” that could come to our 
minds. Even its detractors (and there is an ever growing number of them) seem to 
have been affected by Kuhn’s compelling points about how scientific communities 
(may) produce scientific knowledge. 
 In this Special Issue, three renowned Kuhn scholars—Alexander Bird, Paul 
Hoyningen-Huene and George Reisch—explore key ideas in the book, and some in-
fluences in modern culture, even outside philosophy of science itself (that is the case, 
for instance, of Reisch’s paper). Their contributions are meant to inspire further re-
flections on the impact of Structure now that fifty years have passed since it was first 
published. However, before entering their discussions, a brief introduction to Structure, 
its main argument, and the criticism it has motivated seems appropriate. A retrospec-
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tive view, in short, is in order. I shall try to provide the reader with it in the ensuing in-
troduction. 
2. A Pattern for History 
 “This is an important book”—that was Mary Hesse’s diagnosis in reviewing Struc-
ture (Hesse 1963, 286). Kuhn, she added, had “assembled from various quarters tru-
isms which previously did not quite fit and exhibited them in a new pattern in terms 
of which our whole image is transformed”. Hesse’s words are truly accurate. If we 
take a look to previous criticism of the positivistic tradition, we see that the history of 
science and psychology had already been useful in challenging the epistemological ba-
sis of its methodology. Actually, Kuhn framed some of his own views in an already es-
tablished historiographical tradition, typically neo-Kantian, encompassing works by, 
e.g., Alexander Koyré and Emile Meyerson (see, e.g., SSR, viii; ET, xv, 11; Friedman 
2003, 29; Gutting 2003; Larvor 2003). The same applies to, e.g., W. Köhler and K. 
Koffka’s psychological criticism of philosophical epistemology, which paves the way 
to the naturalistic rephrasing of perceptual experience that Kuhn displays in Structure 
(see, esp., Koffka 1935). 
 I shall not examine Kuhn’s predecessors and sources here. Rather, I shall assume 
what Hesse claims in her review, namely that one can find many ideas typically as-
cribed to Kuhn and Structure in well-known scholarly work, either in the philosophical 
field (Stephen Toulmin [1953; 1961] and N. Russell Hanson [1958] are a case in 
point), or in non-philosophical research (again, recall Koyré), and shall emphasise 
what Hesse says, namely that the book’s main contribution is definitely the historical 
pattern it draws, i.e. the developmental framework it conveys. What elements could we 
discern in that pattern? I shall highlight three of them.  
  A first element is the significance of a historical perspective in constructing our 
view of rationality. Kuhn’s position in Structure leads him to break up with a traditional 
uniformitarian perspective in the philosophical depiction of scientific rationality. This 
uniformitarianism is visible, for instance, in Karl Popper’s perspective on rationality 
and method, in C. G. Hempel’s view on scientific method (even as applied to history 
itself), and also in some modern accounts of David Hume’s view of the constancy of 
human nature and consciousness through history, which, according to an interpreta-
tion (Pompa 1990, 12-16, 42-50), supports the idea that historical contingencies do 
not affect a core of dispositions, beliefs and rules. Certainly, Kuhn’s view is more re-
stricted in scope than Hume’s, because he is not suggesting an alternative theory of 
human nature. Still, Kuhn claims that criteria composing a theory of scientific rational-
ity—whether rules or, Kuhn’s preferred alternative, values—are not constant 
throughout history. They change over time, particularly when a scientific revolution 
occurs. On that account, even though, as Hume says, evidence preserves a causal role 
in the production of certain inferences leading to knowledge, claims concerning the 
inferences (to be) used, the assumptions considered legitimate, and the role evidence 
plays in them are not historically invariable facts. In other words, for Kuhn the ele-
ments of rationality are not combined in the same way in every epoch of the history of 
science. So, if Hume, as seen in this way, is a recognisable predecessor of an empiricist 
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uniformitarian anti-historicism (as, e.g., Hempel’s and Popper’s), then Kuhn is clearly 
arguing against him and the tradition that followed. 
 A second element is the revision of our conception of scientific revolutions, as far 
as the notion itself has its own history (see Cohen 1985). This revision starts from the 
idea that there already is a previous historical pattern in that uniformitarian viewpoint. 
That pattern, though, is hidden because of two facts: (1) scientific disciplines rede-
scribe their own history as they are given birth after a scientific revolution; (2) any 
theoretical, observational or methodological element that does not contribute to the 
current state of science they represent gets lost in redescription. After a revolution, a 
scientist is like—in Kuhn’s words—“the typical character of Orwell’s 1984, the victim 
of a history rewritten by the powers that be” (SSR, 167; see also its entire sec. XI). 
The resulting pattern is always that of a uniform contribution to the current state of 
knowledge—an “Orwellian redescription” actually. This picture of history and its his-
toriography is known as “Whig history”, against which Kuhn sets himself—although, 
as in other cases, he seeks support in historians like, e.g., H. Butterfield (1931; 1949), 
or Koyré (see Larvor 2003).1 
 Finally, a third element is the historical pattern itself, and the explanation of scien-
tific change it provides. Certainly, Kuhn’s alternative to the uniformitarian and Whig 
view of scientific development embraces the idea of a scientific revolution as charac-
terised by premises (1) and (2) in the paragraph above, but his theory is more compli-
cated than that Orwellian redescription. Kuhn’s pattern is not based on the “end 
points” of research—i.e. those theories or theoretical statements that are deemed 
true—as explanatory elements in his account of scientific development. In some pas-
sages of his writings, whether Structure or not, Kuhn seems to be using that recourse; 
e.g., when he said that “Energy is conserved; nature behaves that way” (ET, 72). 
However, in this case Kuhn argues that, even though that fact explains why the ele-
ments that compound the simultaneous discovery of energy conservation “were 
there” [sic], the historian of science does not know how they “suddenly became acces-
sible and recognizable” (ET, 72).2 For him, the, as it were, “final point” of a given 
                                                     
1 There is evidence, however, that Kuhn’s anti-Whiggism is previous to any contact with the history of 
science—including Butterfield’s writings. See Mayoral (2009, sec. 2). On the historiography of scien-
tific revolution, see Beltrán (1995) and Mayer (2000; 2004). 
2 In his commentary on Kuhn’s (1959) paper, the historian Carl B. Boyer (1959) criticised what he con-
sidered a problematic statement (“Energy is conserved; nature behaves that way”). That statement, 
Boyer says, “seems to imply a notion of energy as something actually in nature which we discover, ra-
ther than as a concept which we invent as one appropriate means of describing nature” (Boyer 1959, 
385). Boyer points out, in other words, that even though Kuhn seems to be analysing “discovery” in 
less than Whiggish terms, he is not completely anti-Whig. I think Boyer’s point pertinent, but I also 
think that it is difficult to block out the subsequent history of a scientific discovery and that history—
that “life”—is the subject of the historian’s research. Let’s take into account, for example, that even 
phlogiston was once “discovered”, and, for a considerably long time, it was a successful recourse. If 
so, for a historian of science in mid-eighteenth century, wondering what did lead to phlogiston (as a 
fact of the matter) would not be considered a wrong beginning. The question whether phlogiston and 
energy exist or not—and in what sense we accept the resulting conclusion, whatsoever—is matter for 
a realist and anti-realist philosopher to decide. Meanwhile, it is legitimate to narrate the discovery of 
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body of knowledge does not explain what has driven experts up to that point. The fact 
making a certain statement true does not explain—or, at least, not completely—how 
scientists, organised in a certain way (and organisation is important—more on this be-
low, sec. 5), got to combine the semantic and cognitive categories and the instrumen-
tal tools required to describe the phenomenon in question and to find out if it is true 
or false. In Kuhn’s perspective, it is rather what takes place during the transition from 
some “end point” to the next that gives shape to, properly speaking, an explanation of 
the progress of scientific knowledge, including discoveries of novel facts. Kuhn rules 
out the idea of scientific discovery as a new simple and monolithic fact (or novelty) an 
individual scientist unearths by herself. Scientific progress and discovery, at large, re-
quire a more sophisticated explanation than that. Structure provided a first glimpse of 
the kind of explanation required. 
 If a number of scientific revolutions have happened all over the history of science, 
and if all of them involve a redescription of the previous history, then the historian of 
science’s main task is not descriptive, but rather critical. She should focus on distin-
guishing what has been “scientific”, even though it could be hidden under the history 
written after a scientific revolution (i.e. redescribed at that point) as “unscientific”. 
End points—i.e., scientific novelties or discoveries, for short—will not do if that criti-
cal task is to be done. Thus, Kuhn’s perspective referred to above imposes itself. The 
question now is what happens before and after the emergence of scientific novelties; 
or, in other words, what comes in between two successive scientific revolutions? Struc-
ture suggested an answer to this urgent question. 
3. In the Kingdom of Means 
If Kuhn pioneered the idea that causes explaining scientific advancement cannot be 
final, then he had to point out what other causes we should pick out instead. We can 
understand Kuhn’s answer to this requirement by interpreting it from an axiological 
point of view as follows. 
 For Kuhn, the search for theoretical truth is a basic requirement for every one en-
gaged in a scientific career. As he says in Structure, a high-level commitment for the 
practising scientist is the concern “to understand the world and to extend the preci-
sion and scope with which it has been ordered”, something leading to “scrutinize … 
some aspect of nature in great empirical detail”. However, the scientist may realise 
that what the situation actually requires is “a new refinement of his observational 
techniques or … a further articulation of his theories” (SSR, 42). Some recent sup-
porters of scientific realism have resolved that theoretical truth is just a regulatory ide-
al, whose realisation can at best only be understood as an inference to the best expla-
                                                                                                                                       
phlogiston, or of energy conservation; even more so if we assume—as Kuhn invites to do—that sci-
entific discovery is a process that involves a change of language and world-view, and sometimes so-
cial and institutional transformations. Blocking out phlogiston or energy as realistic assumptions that 
have no place in historiography leads us to a sort of historiographical quietism—and, the worst, be-
cause of hidden realistic assumptions. In my view, this is a common misunderstanding of Kuhn’s an-
ti-Whig convictions. On Kuhn’s anti-Whiggism, see Hoyningen-Huene’s contribution to this Special 
Issue, below. 
Five Decades of Structure: A Retrospective View 
 
Theoria 75 (2012): 261-280 
265
nation at the meta-methodological level.3 Kuhn would agree with the first part of that 
claim: the search for theoretical truth is, at best, a regulatory ideal widely spread all 
over the scientific profession—it is something “without which no man is a scientist”, 
as he says (SSR, 42). However, what leads the scientist to her professional goals is ra-
ther a set of lower-level commitments, whose relative priority depends on the particu-
lar state of the discipline in which she is immersed. Sometimes—and depending on 
the group she is working for—the state of the discipline will require her to contribute 
for the theory or method in question to gain precision or scope. Sometimes, though, 
she will have to reformulate the theory in, e.g., a more powerful mathematical lan-
guage (see SSR, esp. 23-33, for some examples of these different kinds of research). 
Ends inspiring these kinds of work no longer simply amount to the search for theoret-
ical truth, but rather to some more specific goals whose realisation is more likely to be 
perceived. 
 By alluding to these lower-level aims, Kuhn would be able to explain, prima facie, 
how Orwellian redescriptions emerge. However, this would not lead to a truly 
Kuhnian perspective on the progress of science in the sense I am interpreting it here, 
because final causes would have not been left aside. In fact, Kuhn does not base his 
perspective on these kind of values. Rather, they are a sort of spin-off of his more 
fundamental critique of the theories of scientific development. This critique involves 
reconstructing the agent’s point of view as that of an individual who learns and im-
proves an overall perspective on the world and a language that, in principle, are only 
valid within a closed community. In this situation, the appeal to values is uncommon. 
It is more frequent when it comes to an extraordinary-science situation—or to science 
in crisis. Even so, Kuhn says, appeal to values remains idiosyncratic, and sometimes 
factors influencing theory choice are not strictly scientific (SSR, 152-153). All this does 
not mean that science is in Kuhn subjective and irrational—as D. Shapere (1964, 
1966, 1971), or I. Sheffler (1982) said. (See Kuhn’s reply in SSR, 185-186; ET, ch. 13.) 
It does not mean that normative perspectives on rational theory choice are not availa-
ble in Kuhn’s theory, either (see Hempel 1979, 1981, 1983a, 1983b, Kuhn 1983, and 
Salmon 1983), because he can clearly show when a certain theory choice is rational 
and when it is not.4 It is just that Kuhn’s account of rational theory choice does not 
rely on a simple, context-independent set of quasi-algorithmic rules. Normativity is ra-
ther imposed by a language and the “rules” (or rather, the implicit guidelines) for us-
ing it. Saying that a scientist has made a theory choice on the basis of some values 
                                                     
3 An account of the realistic point of view concerning truth can be found in Sankey (2008, ch. 6, and esp. 
96-107) and Psillos (1999, ch. 4). A contrary position is available in Laudan (1984, 1996, esp. ch. 7). 
As it is well known, scientific realism is rather a family of disciplines and its relation to theoretical 
truth is currently a much-disputed issue. So we must take these references as merely representative of 
a high (and increasingly growing) number of works. Sankey (2008, ch. 1) is a careful and informative 
introduction to that family, and further chapters in the same text connects that trend to issues in 
Kuhn’s philosophy of science. 
4 Kuhn’s view on theory choice and its rationality remains for many an open issue as yet. See Nola and 
Sankey (2007, 45-49, 86, 99-100, 236-239, 285-298) and Salmon (2005, ch. 6). 
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(and not others) amounts to speaking about an orthodox behaviour according to a 
paradigm-based language (or theory). 
 So we could say that values supervene on a certain kind of practice as the goals 
that seem to be realised if that practice is deemed satisfactory by the practicing sub-
jects. Of course, this point of view does not exclude that a final goal of gaining theo-
retical truth is ultimately satisfied; and it definitely does not involve, either, that that 
highest-level alethic goal is ultimately unsatisfiable. This option between a realistic and 
an anti-realistic approach to scientific knowledge remains open at this point—
although maybe not beyond this point. Yet, that goal, theoretical truth (and just like 
other, lower-level ones), does not function as a (final) cause of progress.5 “(Being, or 
becoming) scientific” is thus not a matter of fulfilling rules—as methodological im-
peratives—every scientist learns from her earliest moments in the profession. It rather 
consists in something more similar to behaving and speaking correctly within a scien-
tific community. 
 How a social behaviour is scientific in this sense and in absence of continuously 
working rules of scientific method is part of the description that mainly occupies 
Kuhn in Structure. Kuhn describes it in the first sections of the book devoted to depict 
normal science—i.e., secs. II-V—and also in the following sections, where he displays 
two less common situations: science in crisis and extraordinary science. Secs. VI-IX deal 
with this latter situation in more detail. Whatever the situation, however, Kuhn focus-
es on describing the generalised efforts of every member within a community to get 
the theory closer to the world and vice versa. Of course, such words as “theory” and 
“the world” get through a semantic transformation with regard to previous meanings 
in Kuhn’s theory (more on this below, sec. 6). Even so, that would be a good descrip-
tion of the way an average scientist would see her own practice—even though, in the 
renewed terms of Structure, it would be expressed rather differently, as, e.g., pursuing 
the “articulation of a paradigm” or “extending the scope and/or the precision of a 
paradigm”. Structure shows how these more modest activities take place in scientific re-
search on a daily basis, and represent a high percentage of normal activities in science. 
 It should be emphasised that that image of scientific activity is akin to an inten-
tional explanation from an individual point of view. For example, we could explain the 
sort of activities we call normal science as the individual search for coherence within 
the world picture she has been led to by means of her scientific training. Kuhn, how-
ever, did not proceed this way. In Structure we find a sort of historical and anthropo-
logical description of research activities within a scientific community, likely intention-
                                                     
5 Moreover, not only truth does not explain anything by itself—it cannot be the subject of our explana-
tion, either, because we cannot make sense of the expression “achieving the truth” in a non-circular 
way. That is why anti-realism is ultimately Kuhn’s explicit position, as he shows in a later paper: “I 
must first ask what it is that still requires explanation. Not that scientists discover the truth about na-
ture, nor that they approach ever closer to the truth. Unless, as one of my critics suggests [Hawkins 
1963], we simply define the approach to truth as the result of what scientists do, we cannot recognize 
progress towards that goal. Rather we must explain why science—our surest example of sound 
knowledge—progresses as it does, and we must first find out how, in fact, it does progress”. (1970, 
20; ET, 288-289.) 
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al explanations of that behaviour being left aside. This is something we can find in 
Kuhn’s previous—though unpublished—writings as, for instance, his Lowell Lectures 
(Kuhn 1951, esp. lects. V-VI; see SSR, ix), where he accounts for the emergence of 
problem solutions through a change in the viewpoint, which is explained in turn by 
positing a phenomenological world that echoes Kurt Koffka’s “behavioural worlds” 
(Koffka 1935, 31; see also Marcum 2005, 33). This resource (and the corresponding 
intentional explanation) is avoided in Structure, thereby skipping a teleological account 
of scientific behaviour once again. This latter is described in terms of a research be-
haviour characterised by the emergence of a key exemplar, the paradigm, which serves 
as an inspiring model of solved problem, around which a theory or a group of inter-
related theories are erected. In short, even though previous writings attempted at an 
intentional explanation of scientific behaviour, Structure pursues instead a social de-
scription of scientific behaviour. 
 As seen in this way, Kuhn’s perspective can show what lies behind the Orwellian 
redescription of the history of science that takes place during and after a scientific 
revolution. By exploring the scientific behaviour in terms of the recognisable activities 
that an informed reporter (as himself) can observe, Kuhn constructs a social descrip-
tion that shows that scientific research is organised around the enhancement of a 
point of view marked out by a paradigm and the disciplinary resources surrounding it. 
No goals determine scientific behaviour, but rather a seemingly well-arranged social 
activity of research. Scientific revolutions signal the split with ordered research around 
a certain paradigm and the emergence of an alternative. States of crisis are also ac-
counted for as stages with a prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty, when the potential 
of a paradigm to draw together dispersed research seems exhausted, and different 
groups (or schools) look for their own guide. In a nutshell, all that happens in between 
scientific revolutions explains them, whereas the breakthroughs achieved in them—
e.g., discoveries—cannot count as final causes of the progress they represent. Kuhn’s 
theory shows by way of historical criticism how the very same version that accounts 
for the justification of scientific knowledge and offers some prospects of defining a 
demarcation criterion is simultaneously unable to explain properly how scientific 
knowledge is achieved. 
4. Understanding Normal Science 
Structure was a success from the outset. 1900 copies had been sold by February 1963, 
when the University of Chicago Press started to plan a reprint.6 Kuhn had made ef-
forts in order to get the book out of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, (for 
whose second volume it had been commissioned) as also a separate volume (RSS, 
300-301). The press conceded this request. But he was nonetheless concerned about 
the reception. In the first place, he was afraid of a very modest acquaintance with it by 
                                                     
6 See I. Jefferson’s (18 Mar. 1963) and J. H. Storm’s (21 Mar. 1963) letters to Kuhn, TSKP 25.55. Accord-
ing to the University of Chicago Press, almost half a million of copies of the original book (different 
editions) had been sold by 2003, and it has been translated to 33 languages (these facts are taken from 
Solís 2006, p. 32, n. 21). 
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the academy. In the second place, he wished for a good reception on the part of the 
philosophers of science (RSS, 306-307). Actually, as J. W. N. Watkins recalled few 
years later, in 1963 the book had already been “discussed at length at Sir Karl Popper’s 
seminar, where Mr Hattiangadi gave a paper on it (which he afterwards expanded into 
a … dissertation)” (Watkins 1970, 25). In short, the year following its publication, the 
book had sold well, and some philosophers of science were discussing its contents in 
detail. That was just the beginning. 
 A wide reception does not entail a positive reaction. For supporters of Popper’s 
critical rationalism as Watkins and I. Lakatos, it was not easy to admit Kuhn’s empha-
sis on normal science. Watkins made it clear as follows: 
Why has Kuhn, despite his concern “with the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is ac-
quired” [Kuhn 1970, 1; ET, 267], come to identify science with its periods of theoretical stagna-
tion? … why has the author of one excellent book on the Copernican revolution [Kuhn 1957], 
and of another more famous book on scientific revolutions generally [SSR], taken a sort of philo-
sophical dislike to scientific revolutions? Why is he so enamoured with plodding, uncritical, 
Normal Science? (Watkins 1970, 32.) 
Though Watkins is distorting Kuhn’s actual message—it is difficult to grasp any 
“philosophical dislike to scientific revolutions” in Kuhn’s writings whatsoever—he is 
nonetheless illustrating a popular reaction to normal science among many readers of 
Structure, Popper’s disciples included. 
 To tell the truth, normal science is difficult to accept. For some persons, an effort 
is needed in order to avoid undesirable implications, particularly those that verge on 
relativism and irrationalism. However, normal science, as described in Structure, reveals 
that science is a collaborative enterprise in which some likely results are considered as 
matters of fact and what is really in question is who is going to be the individual (or 
group) achieving those results. As Kuhn says in his 1965 paper for the London Collo-
quium at the Bedford College: “In short, though tests occur frequently in normal sci-
ence, these tests are of a peculiar sort, for … it is the individual scientist rather than 
current theory which is tested” (1970, 5; ET, 271). Criticism is, therefore, strategically 
set aside for a while in order to, first, be successful in gaining a high status within a 
scientific community— Kuhn shows that personal decisions in that sense have epis-
temic consequences, and not by accident. Second, criticism is also avoided in order to 
make a change in the current status of the theory that the researcher has been led into 
(a change for good the researcher and the rest of the community are confident that 
can be made). 
 Structure does not say that science cannot be practised in any other way. It just de-
scribes the historical pattern of a class of scientific disciplines that fits that strategic 
way of cooperation and dogmatic behaviour, which matches up with the most ad-
vanced (i.e. successful) ones. Certainly, the term “dogma” is anathema to those who 
pursue a demarcation criterion on the basis of critical rationalism. For good or ill, that 
basis attracted many readers’ attention (and contempt) to this particular aspect of 
normal science—dogmatism. Yet, if we carefully distinguish the socio-historical discourse 
in virtue of which normal science and paradigms are introduced in the first sections of 
Structure from the cognitive view required to explain paradigm-based research, we see 
that there is room for that kind of dogma without affecting the normative assump-
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tions about a rationally constructed view of science. Admittedly, Kuhn’s way of distin-
guishing those kinds of discourse in Structure was not crystal clear—he tried to fix it in 
later writings and lecture series. But we can draw the divide ourselves if we try. 
 So, let us try. First, there are two main ways in which paradigm-based research can 
be introduced: (1) by means of a series of examples, which are supposed to be general 
enough, or (2) by means of an epistemological theory that explains rules away in virtue 
of some theory of human cognition that privileges paradigm-based research to the 
detriment of a rule-based one. In Kuhn’s case, normal science and paradigm-based re-
search is mainly introduced in Structure in the first fashion, whereas its cognitive con-
sequences—which would need an explanation in the second sense—are mostly con-
signed to section X, only. Now, paradigm-based research leads to some striking scien-
tific behaviour: scientists do not react to counterinstances and anomalies as expected. 
They remain plainly conservative, and they prefer to employ their time in solvable 
problems. Their behaviour is, therefore, seemingly dogmatic, which seems to be a 
counterexample to the hegemonic methodological theory;7 even more so if we take in-
to account that this kind of dogmatism leads, according to Kuhn, to a very productive 
pattern of inquiry. 
 That seemingly unexplainable and unreasonable dogmatism leads us to question 
whether paradigm-based research is rational. By adopting a cognitive point of view—
instead of the socio-historical approach that pervades Structure—that kind of dogma-
tism looks rational. From that point of view, there is not—to use Kuhn’s words (SSR, 
114)—any “higher authority” for a scientist other than her own epistemic categories 
and the semantic system she uses to describe the world out there. Kuhn does not de-
vote space in Structure to specifically account for the structure of human cognition and 
communication that his own theory requires. That would have been important, 
though, because doubts about the rationality of a seemingly dogmatic view in this con-
text tend to disappear as soon as the individual point of view is studied in depth.8 For 
instance, when the scientist finds a divergence in results with regard to expectations, 
she also runs into an obstacle—she has to prove oneself and the others that, e.g., that 
divergence is a counterinstance to her pet theory (i.e., that she has truly bumped into a 
genuine anomaly in her assumed, learned theoretical world). If there is no higher au-
thority to rely on in that case, many alternative explanations of the divergence should 
be explored and excluded—for example, that she has found an unexpected conse-
quence of her pet theory, or (worse) that the experimental device does not work well, 
or (still worse) that she has not performed the experiment correctly. Even if we as-
sume that the divergence reflects a true anomaly, the scientist still requires a further 
paradigm in order to properly formulate the nature of the anomaly as the discovery of 
a new sort of phenomenon. Methodological conservatism and dogmatism is, as seen 
                                                     
7 For Kuhn, however, these counterexamples will be tautologies when approached from the new episte-
mological theory he advocates. See SSR, pp. 77-78. 
8 Bird criticises how scarce is Kuhn’s engagement with this matter in Structure and later writings, and how 
promising is, in contrast, this cognitive approach for science studies. See his contribution to this Spe-
cial Issue, below. 
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in this way, a rational behaviour (see Quine and Ullian 1978, ch. 6, for further support 
on this methodological position). Structure would have benefited from a theory of hu-
man cognition explaining this situation in detail, a theory showing how a dogmatic 
behaviour is comparatively more rational than a permanent search for criticism and al-
ternatives—something more akin to Popper’s and P. K. Feyerabend’s positions, re-
spectively. Indeed, dogmatism in Structure is defensible from that point of view. 
 However, a cognitive theory of that kind is, as noted, wanting in Structure. Besides 
that, some of Kuhn’s expressions there do not help much, either. The idea, for in-
stance, that the pattern of scientific practice leading to maturity and productive results 
is mostly composed of “mopping-up operations” (SSR, 24) surely helped to keep 
more heroic depictions of scientific research away—like, e.g., the Popperian account 
of typically rational, properly scientific behaviour. In absence of the proper supporting 
theory, however, eschewing the rationalistic account of behaviour, even as naïve as it 
sounds, produced an undesirable result for Kuhn: Structure was considered a manifesto 
for subjectivism, irrationalism and relativism in the philosophical image of science, 
something totally contrary to his author’s point of view (which, at the end of the day, 
was that of a former theoretical physicist). As he remembers, “Students used to come 
to me saying things like ‘thank you for telling us about paradigms—now that we know 
what they are we can get along without them’. … That wasn’t my point at all”. (RSS, 
308). 
5. The Closed Society 
In his 1995 interview (RSS, pt. 3) Kuhn recalls that once in a Princeton seminar some 
student told the audience that: “You have to realize that in terms of what you are 
thinking of, this [i.e. Structure] is a profoundly conservative book”. Kuhn went on reas-
serting: “And it is; I mean, in the sense that I was trying to explain how it could be that 
the most rigid of all disciplines, and in certain circumstances the most authoritarian, 
could also be the most creative of novelty” (RSS, 308; my italics). We should have in 
mind that previous accounts of scientific progress—Popper’s included—sounded as 
chants of rationality within an open and equalitarian society. Even R. K. Merton’s so-
ciological “ethos of science” (Merton 1942) fits in that picture of society squarely. 
Kuhn showed instead that the locus of science is not society at large—science is not 
public. The scientist is, first and foremost, a member of a relevant group of researchers. 
For someone to become a member of one of these groups a substantial amount of 
training is required. This training includes adopting a sort of “second nature” (as Bird 
says) that influences paradigm-based thinking (see Bird 2002, 450; 2008, 26), an often 
difficult and always highly idiosyncratic language, and a great deal of hands-on experi-
ence. Thus trained, the scientist assumes the problems the community as a whole con-
siders solvable and more pressing, and, as noted, only her competence might be in 
question. Once she has accepted the challenge, she does not work alone any longer—
she works as part of a “cell”, the scientific community. This is the minimum epistemic 
unit (or agent) that trades in knowledge with society at large. 
 So, for Kuhn, scientific knowledge is owned by society only at a price, namely that, 
as regards production, improvement and usage, the agent is no longer the individual, 
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but rather a group, a collective—to wit, in Kuhn, the scientific community. More im-
portantly, the community is an agent that reserves the right to refuse admission. Thus, 
in Kuhn’s theory scientific knowledge is an epistemic tool whose rationality could be 
(as ever) in doubt. Yet, resolving this doubt is no longer accessible to everyone; after 
all, the public has news about scientific knowledge only through that restricted circle 
of producers and owners, the scientific community, which in Kuhn’s picture is that 
sort of “closed society” (I borrow that phrase from Watkins 1970, 26). Criticism of 
scientific knowledge is thus pointless if it is not well informed. But as soon as the in-
dividual is trained in the discipline in question, her ability to criticise diminishes as 
well. If scientific knowledge is granted to the public by means of this structure of 
closed societies, the price may be too high. Steve Fuller (2000; 2003) criticised these 
consequences of Kuhn’s theory, and pointed out some of its likely political and ideo-
logical sources (see also Reisch’s contribution to this Issue, below). 
  Another consequence Kuhn introduced in Structure was even less admissible by 
philosophers of science—incommensurability. Kuhn introduced the term in Structure after 
showing by way of example that the change of meaning after a paradigm shift turns 
the theory emerging from a scientific revolution “not only incompatible but often ac-
tually incommensurable with that which has gone before” (SSR, 103). As far as I can 
tell, the term in question is mentioned for the first time in a private notebook Kuhn 
started in 1949, as a junior fellow of the Society of Fellows (Kuhn 1949, 24), when 
reading a book by the psychologist H. Werner (1948), in order to refer to that effect 
of lack of common measure between kinds of motion in Aristotle’s physics. Like the 
term “paradigm”, which is also visible in his Lowell Lectures (Kuhn 1951, V, 45; VI, 
1) in its usual, psychological sense, incommensurability turned out to be something 
else in Structure. 
 That change of meaning was radical, indeed. In Structure, incommensurability was 
used after showing that the logico-positivistic account of inter-theoretical reduction, a 
common example of which was the reduction of Newtonian to relativistic dynamics, 
was faulty. Allegedly, in making the Newtonian theory derivable from relativity theory, 
the former could be explained in relativist terms (SSR, 101-102). To do so, however, 
definitions of variables must be changed, so “derivation” is not, properly speaking, the 
result of inter-theoretical reduction, but rather a sort of relativistic explanation of 
Newtonian dynamics, which had long left Newton’s theory behind. Both theories, 
Kuhn concluded, were actually mutually incommensurable. If we wish to avoid this 
consequence, we have to restrict the meaning of terms in our pet theory (e.g., in New-
ton’s theory). But Kuhn insisted since at least 1951 (see his last Lowell Lecture) that to 
do so the “range of application [of a theory] must be restricted to those phenomena 
and to that precision of observation with which the experimental evidence in hand al-
ready deals” (SSR, 100). The problem is that the theory would thus be prohibited 
from any area to which it has not been previously applied. This procedure sets a limit 
to the exploration of novelty; it prevents scientists even from relying on a theory in 
their own research if it “enters an area … for which past practice with the theory of-
fers no precedent” (SSR, 100). In short, for Kuhn, the same strategy that helps logical 
positivism to save some theories from sinking into oblivion renders scientific research 
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unable to progress. Ironically, incommensurability is thus rendered as the consequence 
of a kind of language that can deal with unexpected novelty.9 
 That is the language of Kuhn’s closed societies. Three of its properties are clear: (1) 
only experts know how to use scientific language properly; (2) however, experts in dif-
ferent stages of the history of science may have troubles in making it clear what other 
“speakers” tell about the world (e.g., individuals practising science before the latest 
scientific revolution); (3) all efforts to limit referential capacities of these languages to 
what is already known can result in undermining their heuristic power. In other words, 
rational reconstruction and the ability to face novelty are incompatible strategies. 
 It is no wonder Kuhn’s historical pattern of scientific development, with its epis-
temic and semantic analysis in terms of a structure of closed groups (instead of the 
former unified society of individuals) and their languages, was hard to accept. Old 
venerable hopes of universality of language, of simple additivity of scientific results, of 
absence of barriers to human understanding—all these assumed characteristics of sci-
entific rationality were boldly dismissed in Structure in order to construct an alternative 
view into the cooperative enterprise dealing with novelty, and the language that makes 
that cooperation possible (or at least to suggest how it should be done). The question 
is whether these old venerable hopes could really be dismissed by the sort of perspec-
tive that Kuhn articulated in Structure. Actually, it did not seem like they could be dis-
missed, so Kuhn had to practice a more classic philosophical art in subsequent works, 
particularly in those published as an answer to his many critics in the early seventies, 
and later on during the eighties. The evolution of Kuhn’s philosophy is marked out by 
his attempt to make his theory palatable to more traditionally inclined philosophical 
tastes. He gained acceptance among sociologists and socially inclined historians of sci-
ence—the Strong Programme, in particular.10 His main goal, though, was to make his 
developmental turn in science studies possible among philosophers of science, the more 
traditional, the better. 
6. The Worlds We Live In 
Polemic as these ideas were, we should still take into account another radical thesis 
and the section of Structure containing it—section X. In that section, Kuhn talked 
about perception. Note that this is a book in which the practice of science—
something an external observer is entitled to experience and testify—is the main 
theme. However, as far as perception goes, we start requiring a different kind of re-
port: those including information on inner states or representations. Particularly so, as 
far as Kuhn’s aim is to show that a classic dogma of the inherited tradition, observa-
tion language, and the broader perspective embracing it (the empiricist one), must be 
                                                     
9 See a classic discussion of this argument in Field (1973; 2001a). A thorough discussion of incommen-
surability can be found in Hoyningen-Huene (1993, 206-222), including an exhaustive list of refer-
ences on the issue up to the nineties. See also Sankey (1994), Buchwald and Smith (2001), D’Agostino 
(2003), and, of course, Kuhn’s second thoughts on incommensurability in RSS, chs. 2, 4, and Kuhn 
(1999). 
10 A good introduction to this connection is Solís (1994). 
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abandoned. As we see in Structure, more than external reports are required to force 
that abandonment.  
 The section was important to Kuhn himself. Around a year before publishing the 
book, Kuhn told his mentor, James B. Conant, that that section was the most im-
portant in Structure. Section X dealt with paradigm-dependent perceptual experience; 
or, more properly, Kuhn tried to show how the contrary notion—paradigm-
independent perceptual experience, and an antecedently fixed observation language—
was highly unlikely. Actually, the assumption that this contrary notion is possible is for 
Kuhn part of a tradition that went a long way back to the seventeenth century: a large-
ly Cartesian tradition, whose sources were Johannes Kepler’s studies on the eye and R. 
Descartes’s mechanical explanation of vision.11 Kuhn had already shown in earlier sec-
tions of Structure that correcting observational expectations was key to, e.g., noticing 
anomalies (SSR, 62-65), so perception was a not-so-passive source of information for 
our mind. The paradigm-trained mind participates actively in moulding significant expe-
rience. As noted, even though Kuhn made this point clear, he was venturing into an 
entirely new ground. He started describing not how “paradigms are constitutive of sci-
ence”—taking science as an organised practice, as Structure shows—but rather how 
“they are constitutive of nature as well” (SSR, 110; my italics). Moreover, the new ground 
was highly problematic, because Kuhn not only wanted to say that the paradigm-
trained mind interpreted a fixed world, but rather that the paradigm, literally, constituted 
the world. Solving this puzzle without assuming an extreme relativistic position was a 
challenge, indeed. The solution to this puzzle was to produce some argument in which 
the resulting picture displayed perception as paradigm-dependent, and the working as-
sumption of a world outside our senses—i.e., a mind-independent world—was only 
taken, at best, as a causal substratum, our relation to which gets mediated through a 
historically changing set of categories. Not surprisingly, Kuhn’s view recalls Kantian 
epistemology and metaphysics (although a bit revised). He famously said that he was a 
“Kantian with moveable categories” (see, e.g., RSS, 264), and his position should be 
taken as a “post-Darwinian Kantianism” (RSS, 104). Section X brought it forward.12 
 However, we should keep in mind what is involved in a Kantian approach like this. 
It involves metaphysical assumptions concerning the mind and its relation to the 
world, which allow us to draw epistemological conclusions concerning the justification 
of scientific beliefs. Was Kuhn ready to offer that kind of analysis in a book full of in-
direct arguments and “invitations” by counterexamples? Was Kuhn going to change 
his rhetoric in section X?  
 Actually, he did not do it, so it will come as no surprise that many authors consider 
this section both the most thought-provoking in the whole book and, at the same 
                                                     
11 For this historical connection and the previous statement on the importance of this section see Kuhn’s 
letter to Conant, 29 Jun. 1961, TSKP 25.53, 5-6. 
12 To some extent, Kuhn’s work has a family resemblance to C. I. Lewis’s. This latter’s influence on the 
former is visible in Kuhn’s early musings on philosophy; see Mayoral (2009, 179-183). The connec-
tion Kuhn-Lewis has also been explored by Fuller (2000, pp. 266-280) and, more briefly, by Rosen-
thal (2007, 53). 
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time, the most problematic one. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003) is a good example of 
this. For him, “the book climaxes” in section X, where “Kuhn puts forward his more 
radical claims. Not only do ideas, standards, and ways of seeing change when para-
digms change; in some sense the world changes as well” (2003, 96). Kuhn fills up the 
section with phrases expressing how a paradigm shift (which involves cognitive and 
ontological changes in the sense referred to above) brings along a new “form of life” 
entirely—my Wittgensteinian wink is not accidental, for sure. Kuhn put it in more fa-
miliar terms: after a scientific revolution has occurred, “the scientist afterward works 
in a different world” (SSR, 121). A number of similar passages occur in the same sec-
tion, as follows (see a similar selection in Hacking 1993, 276): 
Examining the record of past research from the vantage of contemporary historiography, the his-
torian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change, the world itself chang-
es with them. (SSR, 111) 
In so far as their only recourse to [the world of their research-engagement] is through what they 
see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different 
world. (SSR, 111) 
The very ease and rapidity with which astronomers saw new things when looking at old objects 
with old instruments may make us wish to say that, after Copernicus, astronomers lived in a dif-
ferent world. (SSR, 117) 
… as a result of discovering oxygen, Lavoisier saw nature differently. And in absence of some re-
course to that hypothetical fixed nature that he “saw differently”, the principle of economy will 
urge us to say that after discovering oxygen Lavoisier worked in a different world. (SSR, p. 118.) 
That is the last of the senses in which we may want to say that after a revolution scientists work 
in a different world. (SSR, 135) 
Again, Kuhn does not support this “Living-in-a-different-world talk” in a principled 
way. As in previous sections, he tries to induce a certain expression, sometimes merely 
finding additional support in some broad assumptions—as e.g. the “principle of 
economy” (see Godfrey-Smith’s critical point on this issue [2003, 97]). Moreover, by 
using a series of indirect suggestions—“may be tempted to exclaim that…”, “we may 
want to say that…” (twice), “may make us wish to say that…”, and “will urge us to 
say that…”—Kuhn timidly points to a paradigm shift, this time in the epistemological 
tradition. In short, as in other parts of Structure, Kuhn is not arguing philosophically 
on the basis of any normative principle—although the “principle of economy” is con-
spicuously breaking that rule. Kuhn suggests some generalizations concerning scien-
tific behaviour that invite us to accept that another view of perception and epistemol-
ogy is not only possible, but also preferable. Yet, he does not explicitly say what alter-
natives he is pointing to. (This is the same problem that affects his defence of the ra-
tionality involved in a dogmatic behaviour; see above, sec. 4.) 
 However, the most questionable part of his point came with the ambiguous mean-
ing of “world” in this section, with particular emphasis on the passage I mentioned 
first: the (in)famous statement “though the world does not change with a change of 
paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different world” (SSR, 121). This is a 
problem inherited from the particular rhetoric and argumentation Kuhn has chosen 
here, in which the meaning and nature of some key notion—like “world”—are left for 
the reader to decide. Clearly, the meaning of “world” requires explanation, because, 
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somehow, after assuming that the world is something fixed, it is altered after a revolu-
tion, too. Making sense of this is a difficult challenge, because “the world does not 
change” is stated in the first part of the statement. An epistemically relativistic solution 
would help to make the second part true (“the world has changed”). But it will not do, 
because our solution must meet the requirement that “the world does not change”. 
So, either we conclude that Kuhn has simply made a logical mistake by making an 
analytically false claim, or else we take this to be poetic license so that some sense of 
“world” is here purely metaphorical. Excluding the first option, a literal meaning of 
the term “world” is not assumed in both parts of this conjunction. The remaining 
challenge is to clearing up what part is purely metaphorical and what part is not.13 An-
swering it involves taking issues with an intriguing question, namely: what is the literal 
meaning of “world”? In other words, a corollary of proving that we can provide a 
positive answer to that dilemma is that we already have an answer to the latter ques-
tion. 
 Some philosophers have attempted to answering that question. In 1993, for exam-
ple, Paul Hoyningen-Huene and Ian Hacking met the challenge of this “new-world 
problem”, as Hacking called it. Hoyningen-Huene (1993, esp. ch. 2) offered an epis-
temological solution to it that was based in turn on some explicit metaphysical as-
sumptions, a combination that also reminds us of Kant’s. Hoyningen-Huene showed 
that if we combined an ontology of stimuli and a plurality of “phenomenal worlds” we 
would make sense of Kuhn’s statement. For one thing, the fixed world is a Kantian 
“world-in-itself” (1993, 35), i.e. a causal background. Some epistemological benefits 
follow from that assumption, because scientific statements, observation reports in-
cluded, are justified on the basis of that fixed background, which helps to avoid epis-
temic relativism in turn. For another, paradigm-dependent categories are still active, 
and turn stimuli input into the objects compounding the phenomenal world, i.e., the 
cognitive source of our beliefs. There are as many of these phenomenal worlds as in-
dividuals, but all of them see and speak about the same aspects of the world within a 
given community, so their number is virtually that of scientific communities, not indi-
viduals. The perspective was phenomenalistic rather than realist, one that fit Kuhn’s 
perspective very well. In addition, it saved incommensurability (and the rest of Kuhn’s 
theory) from relativism. The result was highly satisfactory to Kuhn, who famously said 
that “No one, myself included, speaks with as much authority about the nature and 
development of my ideas” (1993, xi). From this point of view, the meaning of “world” 
should include both notions as opposite sides of the same coin. They cannot be sepa-
rated and none of them exhausts the literal meaning of “world” by itself.14 On that ac-
count, the challenge is not the one referred to above. Rather, the challenge is to 
                                                     
13 Howard Sankey, for instance, argues that the expression “world-change” should be taken as a meta-
phor. Even though his point is different from the one I have just made, it is a good example of an 
answer to the challenge. See Sankey (1994, 152-153, 179-180, 187-190). 
14 See Hoyningen-Huene (1993, ch. 2, esp. 36-39, 60-63) for further details about Kuhn’s position and its 
development. 
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change the language that needs a metaphorical sense—i.e. the language that leads us to 
the new-world problem. 
 Ian Hacking’s (1993) solution to the new-world problem focused primarily on the 
ontological aspects of that problem. It is nominalistic and shows that a world of indi-
viduals is compatible with a changing world of natural (for Hacking, rather “scien-
tific”) kinds. Hacking provided Kuhn’s mature view of scientific lexicons with a se-
mantic reconstruction of the lexical structures he seemed to assume, which were al-
tered in a way altogether compatible with Kuhn’s linguistic account of incommen-
surability. Hacking’s version, however, preserves the dichotomy Kuhn seems to criti-
cize, so the literal meaning of “world” corresponds to a world of individuals, which 
are differently classified in scientific kinds after every scientific revolution. Kuhn (RSS, 
229) did not agree with this nominalistic interpretation.15 
 Whatever the solution, however, Kuhn did not seem as much concerned with 
those specific points (at least in Structure) as with promoting a change in philosophical 
language and the epistemological tradition. Perhaps we should understand section X 
as a sort of reductio ad absurdum, in which the new-world problem, as stated there, clos-
es the assumption that observational language is possible with a simultaneous asser-
tion and denial of the same proposition. From this point of view, the new-world prob-
lem reveals that the language of the old epistemological tradition should be altered. If 
true, this interpretation indicates that, in forcing upon us the new-world problem, 
Kuhn is not only attacking the idea of a pure observation language—he is rather pro-
voking a crisis in epistemology by way of a rhetoric device (a bright tactic on that ac-
count). In short, Kuhn is saying that, once we admit that any mature scientific lan-
guage is “paradigm-dependent”, a pure observation language is hard to support. In 
supporting it, we should explain natural-kind terms in absence of a paradigm-
dependent language, and the linguistic vehicle does not seem available. The language 
and world-view assuming that chimera of observation language must be changed, re-
placed by a new epistemological tradition and its linguistic vehicle.  
 As seen in this way, Kuhn’s new-world problem is not a self-contradictory onto-
logical claim. Rather, it leads to conclude that a expression like “the world” belongs to 
a philosophical tradition—the one Kuhn wants to tear down (classic empiricism and 
its modern versions)—that assumes that a part of the language is exclusively devoted 
to express the given aspects of our experience (see Quine 1953). Once Kuhn has 
shown that normal scientific behaviour requires a difference in sense for a key word in 
that traditional language—“world”—and that making that difference explicit leads us 
to conclude that either (i) a contradiction in terms obtains, or (ii) the simultaneous us-
age of a metaphorical and a literal meaning of the very same word is required to de-
scribe the same situation, he is also showing, as noted, that that language (or the epis-
temological paradigm on which it is based) ought to be abandoned. From this point of 
                                                     
15 On Hoyningen-Huene’s and Hacking’s accounts of the new-world problem, see also Preston (2008, 73-
75) and Gattei (2008, 131-133). Of course, there are alternative solutions to the new-world problem, 
e.g., that suggested by Fuller (2002, 87-89), who combines realism about possible worlds and anti-
realism about the fixed world. 
Five Decades of Structure: A Retrospective View 
 
Theoria 75 (2012): 261-280 
277
view, Kuhn is already acting as a linguistic philosopher. His most important section in 
Structure (i.e. sec. X) aimed at suppressing a convention of our language (i.e., that ob-
servation language is possible), and tried to provide an alternative—paradigm-dependent 
language and world (the very basis of his own later linguistic-relativity thesis). 
7. Fifty Years Later 
Let us summarise what we have seen so far. In Structure, Kuhn suggested that the uni-
formitarian view should be altered, that the danger of a blind dependence on an Or-
wellian redescription of the past was real, and that our view of scientific rationality re-
quired us to re-examine our well-established convictions on science. His historical pat-
tern was designed to drive this re-examination. However difficult, the idea that a part 
of our society was closed and spoke its own language—a speech that changed over 
history—had to be considered. Dogmatism seemed to be involved, but Kuhn tried to 
show how it should be properly analysed in order to do without its irrationalistic 
sense. More difficult was to accept that the incommensurability of languages and sci-
entific world-views should also be a part of our conception of science, as well as his 
attack on observational language and the entire tradition that assumed it. Kuhn tried 
all this on the basis of counter-examples and, as it were, poetic license. The problem 
with this style of arguing is that for many analytic philosophers Structure was (and still 
is) an impressionistic, but ill-designed, subjectivist manifesto: a short book prepared to 
attack positivistic viewpoints on science and rationality indiscriminately. In this short 
introduction I have tried to show that Structure was a much more sophisticated instru-
ment of change. It was a monograph that consciously attempted to push a change 
forward by persuading the users of the tradition of the shortcomings of the categorical 
set they assumed. 
 Fifty years later, many issues remain open. The following papers shall discuss some 
of these issues. PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE’s contribution studies the so-called “se-
lectivity of historical judgement”, which leads him to examine Kuhn’s anti-Whig posi-
tion in more detail. Hoyningen-Huene also explores some of Kuhn’s assumptions in 
that sense—the rationality that results from that historical pattern, the kind of internal 
historiography he practiced, and his historical realism. His paper gives us an insight in-
to Kuhn’s anti-Whiggism. ALEXANDER BIRD gets deeper into his classic theses on 
Kuhn, as presented in some of his well known papers and in his book (see e.g. Bird 
2000, 2002, 2005, 2008), namely the significance of Kuhn’s naturalistic turn—against 
his later “wrong turn” to a more positivistic approach to science—and the greater im-
portance of the concept of paradigm over Kuhn’s preferred notion of incommensura-
bility. Bird shall explore the cognitive approach to science studies from the point of 
view of a study of concepts, on the one hand, and a study of cognitive habits, on the 
other, and shall draw conclusion on which is more fundamental than the other. Last, 
but not least, GEORGE REISCH—who more than a decade ago showed that Kuhn had 
not “assassinated” the modern heirs of John Locke (see Reisch 1991)—examines 
Kuhn in the context of Cold-War culture and politics. Reisch argues that the role of 
dogma and theory choice as a “conversion experience” in Structure exemplifies Richard 
Hofstadter’s “paranoid style”, as connected to Cold-War themes and worries. Reisch 
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explores Kuhn’s personal connection to wartime and Cold-War administrator (in addi-
tion to Kuhn’s mentor and sponsor) James B. Conant, and its intellectual consequenc-
es. This is a work to be fruitfully compared with Steve Fuller’s (2000) ground-breaking 
book on similar themes. 
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